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EMIGRATION AND STABILITY IN HONG KONG  
 
Wong Siu-lun 
Professor of Sociology, 
The University of Hong Kong 
 
 
People in Hong Kong may not be keen to cast the ballot, but they are not shy to vote with their 
feet.1 They are emigrating in increasing numbers with the approach of 1997, the year in which 
Hong Kong will cease to be a British colony and become a special administrative region of 
China. According to official estimates, there were 22,400 persons leaving Hong Kong for 
residence overseas in 1980. This figure remained stable for several years. Then in 1987, three 
years after the signing of the Sino-British Agreement on the future of Hong Kong, the number of 
emigrants rose to 30,000. By 1990 the outflow of people reached a peak of 62,000 or about one 
per cent of the population, and it was expected to stay at that level in the near future.2 
 
This outflow constitutes only the tip of the iceberg. There is a large pool of potential emigrants 
with the desire to leave. In the social indicators survey conducted in 1988 on a sample of 1,662 
adults, 17.6 per cent of the respondents declared that they were planning to emigrate.3 A similar 
percentage was found in the survey commissioned by the City and New Territories 
Administration of the Hong Kong Government in 1990. In a sample of 1,661 persons, 16 per 
cent said they had plans to emigrate.4 In a series of telephone interviews carried out by 
Consumer Search Hong Kong Ltd. in 1990 on 500 respondents, those who said that they 'hoped' 
to emigrate comprised 30 per cent of the sample in February, 32 per cent in May, and 28 per cent 
in August.5 Such survey findings clearly show that the size of the pool of potential emigrants 
varies according to how they are being defined, ranging from those who simply express a general 
wish to leave, to those who are actively finding ways to do so, and to those who have already 
submitted applications to become citizens in various countries abroad. The popular desire to 
emigrate also fluctuates widely, being affected by significant events such as the 1989 Tiananmen 
incident in China.  
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The characteristics of the actual and potential emigrants are reasonably well known by now. 
They are predominantly 'yuppies' - young, educated, middle class professionals. According to 
official estimates for 1989, 48.8 per cent of the emigrants as compared with 32.3 per cent of the 
total population were between the age of 25 and 44. About 14.5 per cent of the emigrants had a 
first degree or postgraduate qualification, and 23.3 per cent of them were employed as 
professionals, technical, administrative and managerial staff before they left. The corresponding 
percentages in the total population in 1986 were only 5.6 and 5.9 respectively.6 In the 1988 
social indicators survey, it was found that '25.7 per cent of those below 30 years old, 36.8 per 
cent of those with high educational level, 44.2 per cent of those with a monthly income of more 
than ten thousand [Hong Kong] dollars, 36.9 per cent of the administrative and managerial 
workers, and 29.5 per cent of the professional and technical workers declared that they were 
planning to emigrate.'7 
 
This large scale emigration of the elites has caused alarm in Hong Kong. There are fears that 
such an outflow will undermine social stability for three main reasons. First, it is said that the 
brain drain will lead to a depletion of the 'functional core' of the economy. Second, it is felt that 
the widespread desire to leave will engender a doomsday syndrome and result in a state of 
anomie. Third, it is alleged that the desertion of the elites will create a crisis of legitimacy and an 
erosion of the moral basis of authority. Such worries are understandable, but they are not well 
founded. By scrutinizing each of them in turn, I shall argue that these concerns have been 
exaggerated. I hope to demonstrate that the present pattern of emigration is actually part and 
parcel of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. But before looking into the issues of brain 
drain, anomie and crisis of legitimacy, it would be instructive to review the nature and 
consequences of previous waves of emigration.  
 
 
 
Emigration in 1958 and 1967  
 
The history of Hong Kong as a British colony is a history of the movement of people in and out 
of the place. Emigration is not a new phenomenon. In the post-war period, at least two major 
waves of emigration have preceded the present one. The first wave occurred in 1958-61 as a 
result of the vegetable revolution in the New Territories, and the second wave was triggered by 
the 1967 riot which was a spill-over of the Cultural Revolution in China.  
 
The first wave of emigrants in 1958-61 were mainly drawn from the rural areas of Hong Kong in 
response to an agricultural crisis. At that time, the traditional rice economy was giving way to 
vegetable cultivation introduced by new immigrants from the Chinese mainland who turned 
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themselves into innovative farmers. For the rural inhabitants whose land were not suitable for the 
cultivation of cash crops, they had to look for alternate means of livelihood. A substantial 
number of them, such as the Mans of San Tin village, went abroad with the help of their lineages 
which provided loans and travel services to their members.8 As British subjects, these rural 
emigrants were admitted into Britain without any restrictions before the passage of the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act. They set up Chinese restaurants in the United Kingdom and 
later diversified into other parts of Europe. So successful was the restaurant trade that 
remittances from these emigrants quickly transformed their home communities in the New 
Territories from precarious regions of production into prosperous areas of consumption. During 
that process, there was a simultaneous levelling of internal economic differences in the 
communities. The prolonged absence of adult men in those villages had created problems in 
security, marriage, sexual gratification, and the socialization of the young. Yet the overall effect 
was a strengthening of puritanical norms and community cohesion. 'Rather than acting as change 
agents,' James L. Watson writes, 'the retired emigrants are often among the most enthusiastic 
proponents of traditional values in San Tin'.9 The result of emigration was what he calls 
'conservative change' in the New Territories.  
 
While the first wave was basically an economic phenomenon, the second wave of emigration 
that came a decade later was triggered by a political crisis. The 1967 riot, led by local 
communists, began with demonstrations and work stoppages which turned into violent 
confrontation and terrorism. About 8,000 suspected bombs were reported; over 1,000 were found 
to be genuine. Fifteen persons were killed during the disturbance.10  
 
The riot shook Hong Kong to its core. Many of its elites took flight. Unfortunately the social 
consequences of the riot have not yet been systematically studied, and there are only fragmentary 
information on the movement of people out of Hong Kong at that time. A survey of 253 senior 
local civil servants in 1972 found that nearly 60 per cent of them would like to emigrate if 
possible.11 The United States was the most popular destination. In 1970, 9,720 immigrants from 
Hong Kong were admitted there. Restricted by quotas, the annual outflow to the US stayed 
around 10,000 persons in the 1970s and 1980s. The immigration record of Canada was more 
revealing. In 1970, 4,509 persons from Hong Kong landed in Canada. Then there was a sudden 
upsurge in 1973 to 14,662 persons which gradually subsided to 6,371 by 1977. The steep rise in 
1973 was evidently caused by a change in immigration policy in Canada. But it was also a 
dramatic indication of the pent-up urge to leave Hong Kong in the wake of the 1967 riot.12 
 
How many of those who left during the second wave later returned to Hong Kong? No reliable 
figures are available, but it is reasonable to assume that the number of returnees is unlikely to 
have been large due to the high costs of relocation and the policies of host countries to encourage 
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immigrants to settle permanently. In the 1988 social indicator survey, only 4.8 per cent of the 
respondents in Hong Kong said they had overseas residential rights and were probably 
returnees.13 Yet the loss of elites in the early 1970s did not result in social and economic chaos. 
Rather, Hong Kong experienced a period of sustained growth and stability afterwards. Since 
1967 the gross domestic product has grown at an average rate of 10 per cent up to 1980.14 
Instances of collective violence, reaching a peak of ten eruptions in 1965-69, tapered off with 
just four incidents in the 1970s.15 
 
Why was this so? Ian C. Jarvie, writing soon after the 1966 and 1967 riots, provided a clue. In 
his view, Hong Kong was riot prone because of the existence of an acute generation gap. A local 
identity was emerging among the young adults raised entirely in Hong Kong. 'Hong Kong is to 
them a home, not a haven of refuge, and they judge it by different standards than their refugee 
parents... They are experiencing a revolution of rising expectations'.16 But the 1967 riot, by 
highlighting the threat of communism and the precarious existence of Hong Kong, had actually 
served to dampen the rise of this indigenous identity and cool off the rising expectations among 
the young. Its unintended consequence was to reinvigorate the refugee mentality among Hong 
Kong Chinese families. The Shanghainese textile industrialists, for example, pursued more 
energetically their strategy of diversification of investments and spreading their children 
abroad.17 
 
This brief review should demonstrate that the two previous waves of emigration were both 
responses to threats of social disorder, not the causes of instability themselves. Now let us 
examine the three popular worries concerning the current exodus.  
 
 
Brain Drain  
 
Alarm over the loss of talents is a recurrent theme in the post-war development of Hong Kong. 
During the debate on the recent outflow, a group of scholars put forth the notion of the 
'functional core' which they define as 'the subgroup of key personnel in an organization who are 
critical to its normal conduct of business'. They use a monthly income of HK$12,500 and above 
as a reflection of functional importance, and estimate that there were 96,180 core personnel in 
the private sector and 33,983 in the civil service in 1989. If these people were gone, according to 
them, the economy would cease to function.18 
 
The idea of the functional core is intuitively appealing, but it can easily create a confusion 
between roles and role occupants. Positions may be critical and indispensable, but not 
necessarily the individuals staffing them. Whether emigration will endanger the functional core 
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depends very much on the rates of depletion and replenishment of the occupants of those key 
positions.  
 
The rate of depletion in Hong Kong varies by occupational sector. According to Kwong and his 
associates, the rate could be as high as 35 per cent in 1987-88, prevailing among accountants and 
computer programmers. However, it could be as low as 6.5 per cent, as found among the general 
and production managers.19 The organizational survey conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of 
Personnel Management on 318 companies showed an average staff turnover rate of 28.4 per cent 
in 1989. But emigration only accounted for a tiny 3.3 per cent of all resignations, even though 
the majority of those emigrating belonged to the managerial, supervisory, technical and 
administrative levels.20 
 
The rate of depletion, though relatively high in some occupations, is not a haemorrhage. It is 
regulated by the immigration quotas and targets set by host countries such as the United States 
and Canada, and they are not amenable to quick changes. Therefore the outflow of talents is 
gradual and orderly under normal circumstances. However, an element of unpredictability is 
introduced by the British Nationality Scheme enacted in 1990. Under that scheme, 50,000 
households in Hong Kong will be granted full British citizenship without residential 
requirements in the United Kingdom. The official intention is 'to give key people the confidence 
to remain in Hong Kong'21, but in effect it creates the possibility for large numbers of people to 
leave en masse at their own discretion. 
 
Besides this element of unpredictability, the present outflow may lead to a loss of experience at 
the senior and middle levels in both private and public organizations. The quality of decision-
making, particularly in crisis management, may decline. But such an impact, being intangible in 
nature, is difficult to gauge. It could well be neutralized by the benefits to be gained through an 
accelerated mobility and vigorous circulation of elites.  
 
In order to replenish the depleting stock of talents, the Hong Kong government adopted a three-
prong policy in 1990 to cope with the situation: 'in the short term by being more flexible over 
proposals for importing skills from neighbouring countries; in the medium term by facilitating 
the return to Hong Kong of former migrants, and in the long term by boosting output from Hong 
Kong's tertiary institutions'.22 But even without these new measures, there were more people 
coming into Hong Kong than going out throughout the 1980s. In 1990 there was a net gain of 
11,581 persons according to official figures.23 Those who came in consisted of legal and illegal 
immigrants from China, and skilled and semi-skilled migrants from overseas. In Ronald 
Skeldon's assessment, such immigration and the 'natural production' by the local educational 
system would have more than compensated for the loss through out-migration, both in numbers 
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and in quality.24 
 
However, there are two hidden dangers in the replenishment of manpower. The first is the sharp 
reduction in illegal immigrants from China after the 'reach-base' policy was abolished by the 
government in 1980. Previous to the change, illegal immigrants who had evaded capture at the 
border were allowed to stay. 'Net migration was about 400,000 during the 1950s, some 120,000 
during the 1960s and another 500,000 during the 1970s. The inflow between 1978 and 1980 
alone was nearly 400,000 comprising almost equal numbers of legal and illegal immigrants.'25 
The illegal immigrants were predominantly young male adults who took up work as production 
workers, transport operators and labourers in Hong Kong. They supplied the bulk of the 
manpower in the manufacturing industry, and the enterprising ones among them later became 
small factory owners. Since the change in policy, illegal immigrants dwindled to 9,220 in 1980 
and then rose again gradually to 27,826 in 1990, but it was still far below the level of influx in 
the 1970s.26 Concomitant with this decline, there developed in the Hong Kong economy an 
acute shortage of labour and a shrinkage in entrepreneurial supply. In surveys conducted in 1987, 
it was found that only 3.9 per cent of the small factory owners in Hong Kong were recent 
Chinese immigrants who arrived in the territory after 1978. But the corresponding proportion in 
Macau was nearly 29 per cent. The stream of illegal immigrants from China was apparently 
being redirected into Macau since 1978 because of the relative ease of entry, and the inflow 
spurred industrial growth there.27 
 
The second danger is sharp fertility decline. The total fertility rate in Hong Kong fell rapidly 
since 1961 and reached replacement level in 1979. By 1986 the net reproduction rate had 
dropped to 0.64, one of the lowest in the world. According to Ronald Freedman, 'if the fertility 
and mortality rates remained stationary at the 1986 level, eventually, as Hong Kong's population 
ages, population size would decline by 36 per cent per generation without taking migration into 
account'.28 However, the Hong Kong government shows no sign that it is taking the implications 
of this dramatic pattern of fertility decline seriously and is devising ways to deal with them.  
 
Therefore, in my view, the popular alarm over the phenomenon of brain drain is misplaced. The 
real threat to the future socioeconomic well-being of Hong Kong is not the high rate of depletion 
of talents, but the hidden crisis of replenishment created by immigration and fertility reduction.  
 
 
Anomie and Moral Hazards  
 
Will Hong Kong degenerate into a state of anomie as 1997 approaches? Will the citizens there be 
infected by a doomsday syndrome and set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy of social collapse? 
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Popular apprehension is indeed pervasive. Collective pessimism about the future does exist. 
Most of the respondents in the 1988 social indicator survey had gloomy views about the social 
situation after 1997. The large majority of them anticipated a curtailment of civil rights (75.5 per 
cent), a reduction of individual liberty (73.2 per cent), a decline of the legal system (61.1 per 
cent), and a deterioration in living standards (66.9 per cent). In response to the question of 
whether life would be better and happier after 1997, more than half of them thought that to be 
unlikely. Nearly one in two of them said they were worried about political instability before 
1997, and one in four of them believed that public order would deteriorate in the near future.29 
That apprehension was shared by another group of respondents surveyed in 1990 by the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption of the Hong Kong Government. One in five of 
them thought that corruption cases would increase in the next few years mainly because of the 
mentality fostered by the problem of 1997.30 Furthermore, a disjunction clearly existed between 
the widespread desire to leave and the actual chances of emigration among inhabitants. It would 
be reasonable to assume that frustrated individuals might be tempted to take short-cuts in order 
to get rich quickly and to increase their chances of leaving. It should not be surprising to find 
local insurance companies reportedly concerned about the proliferation of fraudulent claims and 
the increase in 'moral hazards'.31 
 
However, there is no evidence yet that anomie is becoming rampant. The overall reported crime 
rate in Hong Kong is very steady. There were 1,410 cases per 100,000 population in 1988 as 
compared to the rate of 1,223 cases in 1978. Only burglaries and serious narcotic offences had 
increased noticeably during the 10 year period.32 The suicide rate remained low. Only 616 
deaths in 1989 and 587 in 1988 were determined by the coroners as being caused by suicide.33 
Although the absolute number of divorce petitions had increased from 1,728 in 1978 to 5,893 in 
1988, the divorce rate was still comparatively low: only 0.6 divorces per 1,000 inhabitants 
throughout the 1980s in contrast to the 4.8 divorces per 1,000 in the United States.34 
 
Rapid deterioration is unlikely to occur in the near future mainly because the process of 
emigration actually strengthens social control in two ways. Firstly, it acts as a safety valve to 
relieve frustration. Secondly, it reinforces social networks and checks massive deviance.  
 
The attitudes of the Hong Kong people contain a curious paradox: collective pessimism about 
the post-1997 situation exists side by side with individual optimism about future advancement. 
As noted above, most respondents in the 1988 social indicator survey anticipated decline in 
important aspects of social life after 1997. Yet at the same time, they believed that the social 
standing of their children would be better than their own in the future. 'Nearly 80% of the 
respondents thought that their children would be in the middle (54%) or the upper-middle (25%) 
stratum. The optimism did not seem to wane too much even if the future means 1997. The 
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majority were of the view that the socio-economic status of their children would be better than 
their own both before and after 1997.'35 
 
How can collective pessimism coexist with individual optimism? The paradox disappears if we 
distinguish between the attitudes of the elites from those of the masses. The elites have the 
option of leaving Hong Kong and they can pursue their dreams of advancement abroad. They 
probably see the prospects for their children in a cosmopolitan context. Those who have plans to 
emigrate, as shown in the 1988 survey, tend to be less satisfied with the existing situation in 
Hong Kong, more concerned with various social problems and less impressed with the 
government's ability in handling those problems. As a disgruntled and critical lot, they will 
disperse through emigration. Their discontent is unlikely to fester because of their transient 
status.  
 
As for the masses in the lower social strata who have to stay, they see little prospect for 
themselves. But they have high hopes for their children. With the elites leaving town in large 
numbers, they perceive opportunities for mobility opening up for their children even though the 
overall socioeconomic condition in the future may not be as good as the present. That hope 
should reduce their frustration and sustain their commitment to existing social norms.  
 
The elites and the masses do not share a common frame of reference. Their definitions of the 
social situation differ. Thus it is unlikely for them to act in concert to bring about a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of doom and disintegration. Furthermore, the process of emigration itself imposes 
control on individual deviance. Emigrants have to produce a certificate of no criminal record 
before they can gain entry into destination countries. However keen they may be in accumulating 
wealth, they must be careful not to run foul of the law and have their records tainted. They also 
have to rely on their social networks to help them to relocate. Assistance from friends and 
relatives are needed in securing information, advice and support in starting a new life in a 
foreign country. Potential emigrants need to uphold their personal reputation and nourish 
harmonious relationships within their social networks before they can tap the pools of good will. 
Since networks are overlapping in nature, very few individuals will have exactly the same circle 
of friends and relatives. Thus it is very difficult for a small band of people to collude in deviant 
acts and escape detection and social sanction.  
 
The social order in Hong Kong is built on flexible and interwoven networks rather than on strong 
groups such as church communities, political parties or trade unions. By activating those 
networks, emigration serves to strengthen the foundation of such a social order, not weakening 
it. However, this type of social constitution has its own vulnerability. The chief one is that it is 
prone to the eruption of mass panic. The Hong Kong dollar crisis in September 1983 and the 
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bank run after the closure of the Hong Kong branch of the Bank of Credit and Commerce in July 
1991 are conspicuous examples. Rumours tend to spread rapidly through social networks during 
emergencies. The government is the only dominant institution with the ability to impose social 
discipline and command confidence in those circumstances. Therefore it has a special task, 
particularly in the current jittery times, to anticipate such eruptions and to prepare contingency 
plans well in advance on how to control the sudden outbursts of mass hysteria.  
 
 
Erosion of Authority  
 
During this transitional period, there is a growing concern about the crisis of legitimacy and the 
governability of Hong Kong. Ian Scott, for example, argues that the government has lost the 
support of critical social groups as shown in their mass desertion. 'Emigration may be interpreted 
as a vote of no confidence in the Special Administration Region government but it may also be 
inferred that many emigrants have no faith in the present government's ability to handle their 
future affairs. The rising tide of emigration ... alienated the young and better educated and 
eroded the moral basis of authority.'36 
 
But Hong Kong is after all a colony. It is doubtful whether the government has ever had a moral 
basis of authority for it to command allegiance from the Chinese population in the first place. It 
would indeed be surprising, as Scott seems to prescribe, to find positive political support such as 
'mass demonstrations backing the Hong Kong government'.37 Lau Siu-kai is probably closer to 
the mark when he describes the Hong Kong political arrangement as a 'minimally-integrated 
social-political system' with the bureaucratic polity and the Chinese society keeping each other at 
arm's length.38 With such an arrangement, Hong Kong had enjoyed a long period of stability. A 
delicate balance was struck between a limited polity and a dynamic society. The former fostered 
'system trust' by providing an administrative and legal framework which was conducive to fair 
competition. The latter thrived on personal trust and was propelled by a pervasive refugee 
mentality and entrepreneurial familism.39 In this set-up, the government was playing the role of 
a referee. It gained popular support through its efficiency and impartiality in enforcing the rules 
of the game. But it did not have the moral authority to lead and to mobilize the populace. 
Therefore increased emigration would not undermine its basis of legitimacy which was 
essentially pragmatic in nature. Rather, emigration might fortify the refugee mentality and 
entrepreneurial familism within the community and reinforce its dynamism.  
The prevalent refugee mentality in Hong Kong has several key features. First of all, the actual or 
potential emigrants are mainly elites. They are pushed to leave by the perception of political 
threats. They are not pulled away by economic opportunities. They are 'yuppie' refugees, not 
sojourners. The second characteristic is a preference for 'exit' over 'voice' as the means to express 
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dissatisfaction.40 The majority of the Hong Kong people have a strong sense of political 
powerlessness. Recent political reforms notwithstanding, they continue to feel that they have 
very little influence on government policies. The third feature is an instrumental attitude towards 
the issue of nationality. Passports are regarded mainly as travel and insurance documents; they 
are not endowed with much emotional significance such as national commitment and loyalty. 
Moral judgments are suspended on other people's decision to leave or to stay. Fourthly, there 
exists a deep ambivalence towards China and a conflicting sense of identity. Most Hong Kong 
residents are torn between a revulsion against China as a communist state and an attachment to 
China as their motherland. Among the young and the educated, more of them begin to regard 
themselves primarily as 'Hong Kong people' rather than as 'Chinese'. There has developed a 
growing identification with Hong Kong, probably more as a way of life than as a place of 
residence. That identity can be mobile and cosmopolitan. The last feature is an emphasis on self-
help and autonomy. Personal liberty is highly valued; poverty is seen as the result of individual 
inadequacies.  
 
As a prevailing ethos, this refugee mentality does not exclude the co-existence of other 
orientations. On the other hand, neither is it confined to those with an expressed desire to leave. 
It appears to infect all those with family members or relatives abroad. Such a mentality induces 
immunity to political passions and ideological fervour within Hong Kong. It lowers popular 
expectations and demands on the polity. It tends to reduce the problem of legitimacy crisis into 
an academic issue.  
 
But more important than its political impact, the refugee mentality actually creates a spirit of 
enterprise and engenders economic dynamism.41 It boosts the achievement motivation, 
encouraging most Hong Kong people to believe that one can become somebody through one's 
own effort. It reinforces the quest for educational qualifications as a form of mobile asset. It 
fosters a high rate of savings to prepare for the rainy day. It strengthens the habit of alertness and 
vigilance as shown in the local appetite for newspapers, mobile phones and fax machines.  
 
The economic dynamism generated by the refugee mentality is complemented by a form of 
'entrepreneurial familism'.42 The basic unit of decision-making and risk-bearing in Hong Kong is 
the family. Throughout the social spectrum, it is within the family that resources are pooled and 
strategies devised to seek security and advancement. Individuals strive and compete within the 
webs of personal ties spun by the multitude of families, and they are seldom atomistic. 
Responding to the uncertain future, various families decide to diversify their physical and human 
capital and extend their networks globally. Through emigration, this entrepreneurial form of 
familism is enhanced rather than decimated.  
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As noted earlier, Hong Kong is experiencing a rapid fertility decline. The ideal family size is 
decreasing and is matching the actual size. The norm as found in a 1987 survey was just two 
children with a notable minority preferring only one child or none at all.43 Would this undermine 
the vitality of entrepreneurial familism? The reasons given by the respondents for not wanting 
more children did not indicate a weakening of the family. Nearly half of those interviewed 
justified their choice of family size with the statement that 'I hope to give every child as much 
education as possible'. Another 37 per cent of them said they did not want to have more children 
because of the financial burden involved. Other reasons, including the uncertain political 
prospect of Hong Kong, were regarded as insignificant.44 It was thus the concern for enhancing 
human capital and competitiveness - the core value of entrepreneurial familism - that led to 
decisions to have fewer children.  
 
The popular course adopted by Hong Kong families is to invest in their children's education. In 
the next few years, the opportunities to acquire local tertiary qualifications will be rapidly 
expanded. The Hong Kong government announced in 1989 an accelerated plan to increase the 
number of first year, first degree places from about 7,000 at that time to 15,000 in 1995. This 
meant making tertiary places available to 18 per cent of the relevant age group in 1995 as 
compared to the 7 per cent in 1989. The dramatic move was made after the shock of the 
Tiananmen incident in China. The main aims, according to the government, were to cope with 
the exodus of talents, to upgrade skills for the future, and to satisfy parental demands so as to 
restore public confidence in the territory.45 But it is very likely that this policy will lead to 
educational inflation and the depreciation of credentials. The high expectations of families will 
turn into discontent when their investments in education do not bring the anticipated economic 
rewards. Anomie, as Emile Durkheim has pointed out, feeds on insatiable desires. By prescribing 
the popular but wrong medicine of tertiary educational expansion for the symptoms of 
emigration, the Hong Kong government may in effect be sowing the seeds of anomie in the 
future by failing to keep the insatiable desires for qualifications in rein.  
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
In a recent letter published in the Economist, a Mr. Muzaffar Ahmed takes Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, 
former Prime Minister of Singapore, to task for the latter's views on democracy and economic 
growth. 'Can Mr. Lee explain why,' Ahmed writes, 'in spite of spectacular growth, thousands of 
Singaporeans flee Singapore for a better life overseas? Why is it, in spite of rapid economic 
growth rates, people from Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea are interested in migrating to 
the United States, Australia and New Zealand?'46 
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His letter reflects the popular use of the problem of emigration as rhetoric. In Hong Kong, it has 
been invoked by the government as a bargaining chip in political negotiations with China. It has 
been employed by various occupational groups to press for a bigger quota for their members in 
the British nationality package. Such rhetoric is conducive to exaggerations and tend to cloud 
our judgment. With careful analysis, it should be clear that the recent outflow does create 
difficulties of adjustment in the economy, but it does not constitute a crisis of stability. By over-
reacting to the rhetoric, the Hong Kong government may be adopting rash decisions that will 
only worsen the situation. The real issues, as accentuated by the recent wave of emigration, are 
problems of restrictive immigration and fertility decline which endanger the replenishment of 
talents. As real threats to the socioeconomic future of Hong Kong, it is these two issues that call 
for urgent attention.  
 
But the letter also serves to put the case of Hong Kong into comparative perspective. The size of 
its recent wave of emigration is indeed eye-catching, but Hong Kong is by no means unique in 
the massive outflow of population. In this respect, the 'four little dragons' are in good company. 
For instance, in 1989, the United States admitted more immigrants from Korea (31,604) and 
Taiwan (14,705) than from Hong Kong (12,236). As for sending immigrants into Australia, 
Hong Kong topped the list with 9,998 persons (about 1.78 per thousand population) in 1988/89, 
but Singapore was not far behind with 2,806 persons (1.06 per thousand population).47 
Moreover, the emigrants from these areas seem to have a similar profile. They tend to be young, 
educated professionals.48 
 
Thus the 'four little dragons' have more things in common than their similar rates of economic 
growth. All of them are stressing competition through education, experiencing rapid fertility 
decline, and exporting people as well as goods. One wonders whether the refugee mentality is 
one of the common denominators among them. Hong Kong may be special in having a definite 
date with destiny in 1997, but it shares with the other three 'dragons' a similar history of refugee 
influx, an uncertain political future, and a collective sense of anxiety and nervousness that impels 
economic endeavour. Massive migration and spectacular economic growth may well be two 
sides of the same coin. Outflow of people and internal social stability may well go hand in hand 
in these edgy communities.  
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